Prompt: Imagine that in the future there is a teleporter that works this way: A human being steps into a chamber, where a computer scans and records the placement and composition of each of the molecules in her body. In the process of scanning, the teleporter disintegrates her body—her molecules are detached and scattered. The recorded information is then transmitted to a teleportation chamber far away in a second location. This second chamber takes new molecules from its environment and builds up an exact molecule-for-molecule duplicate of the human being that entered the first chamber. Importantly, the human being who exits the second chamber has exactly the same apparent memories, thoughts, desires, passions, and plans as the human being who entered the first chamber. Assume that the teleporter always works flawlessly, and as intended – it never breaks down, and nothing ever goes wrong! In this respect, it is even more reliable than air travel. Are there any well-founded and rational reasons to not use teleportation? Explain and justify your answer with reference to the philosophical debate over personal identity.
Introduction
The teleportation thought experiment presents one of the most stimulating challenges to our understanding of personal identity and survival. In this scenario, a machine scans the molecular structure of an individual, disintegrates their body, and reconstructs an exact duplicate at a distant location. This thought experiment raises a point of contention: is this individual the same person, or has the original been destroyed? This problem compels us to confront whether personal identity depends on strict numerical sameness or whether continuity of consciousness is sufficient for survival (Williams, 1970). John Locke’s theory of personal identity ties the self to memory and consciousness (Locke, 1690/1975), while Derek Parfit argues that identity is not the most important matter; instead, psychological continuity and connectedness constitute genuine survival (Parfit, 1984). In this essay, I will follow Parfit’s ideology that teleportation undermines strict identity, but preserves what he calls psychological survival (Parfit, 1971). While some theories, such as animalism (Olson, 1995) and dualism (Descartes, 1641/1973), suggest that teleportation destroys the self, I will explore how psychological continuity, through memory, intention, and mental connectedness, captures what is essential for rational survival.
The Teleporter Problem
The teleportation case is considered a principal thought experiment when discussing personal identity because it disrupts our usual assumptions about persistence through time. In the scenario, an individual enters a teleporter that scans and records the complete molecular structure of their body before destroying it, then reconstructs an exact duplicate elsewhere using new matter. The person who emerges has the same memories, desires, and psychological characteristics as the original. The debate, however, is whether the duplicate is genuinely the same person or merely a convincing copy (Williams, 1970). Unlike ordinary survival, which involves continuous physical and biological existence, teleportation disrupts the persistence of bodily continuity. Theories of identity that prioritise psychological features, such as Locke’s memory theory, suggest that identity is preserved (Locke, 1690/1975), while perspectives that focus on physicality, such as animalism, stress that the destruction of the biological organism constitutes death (Olson, 1995). Consequently, the teleporter case encourages philosophers to determine whether identity should be understood in terms of strict numerical sameness or whether psychological continuity is sufficient for survival.
The Psychological Continuity of Personal Identity
John Locke was one of the first philosophers to argue that true personal identity is grounded in psychological continuity rather than bodily substance. For Locke, identity depends on the persistence of memory and consciousness across time (Locke, 1690/1975). If a person in one moment can remember the experiences of a person at an earlier time, then they are the same person. Applied to the teleporter case, Locke’s stance would follow that the reconstructed individual is identical to the original, since they share the same memories, thoughts, and intentions. However, Locke’s account presents difficulties in the case of duplication. If two individuals emerge from different teleporters, each with the same memories, both would appear to qualify as the same person, which leads to the paradox of one individual being numerically identical to potentially multiple others (Clairborne, 1995). This tension explores the idea that memory alone cannot fully capture what we mean by identity.
Derek Parfit extends and refines Locke’s line of thought, arguing that identity does not hold the most importance, instead placing importance on psychological continuity and connectedness, the survival of memory patterns, intention, and character traits (Parfit, 1984). Regarding Parfit’s view, he views questioning whether the teleported individual is the same person as misleading, because strict identity is not the main issue. What matters is whether there is sufficient psychological survival to preserve one’s projects, relationships, and sense of self, and teleportation achieves this continuity, regardless of the absence of the initial biological organism (Parfit, 1971). By reframing the debate, Parfit shows that our concern for exact numerical identity may be conflated. Rationally, value should be placed on psychological continuity, and teleportation preserves that.
Objections: Biological and Dualist Views
Although psychological continuity theories suggest that teleportation preserves what matters, several influential objections challenge this. One of the strongest defences is Eric Olson’s animalism, arguing that personal identity relies on the continued existence of the same biological organism (Olson, 1999). Following this view, Olson argues that we are fundamentally human animals, rather than beings of complex psychological states (Olson, 1995). Since teleportation destroys the body and the biological organism ceases to exist, this would mean that the original person has died. Animalism maintains that the teleported individual is a duplicate and not the same person, regardless of whether they appear identical, therefore viewing teleportation as choosing death.
A similar reflection is raised by Bernard Williams, highlighting the rational fear that would be associated with the destruction of one’s body. He argues that it is reasonable to dread the teleporter, even if an identical copy is created, because the process of being disintegrated destroys the link between one’s present self and any future being. From this perspective, survival requires more than psychological resemblance; it also requires the continuous existence of the same subject (Williams, 1970). This argument acknowledges the intuitive unease that many people feel when considering the prospect of teleportation.
Cartesian dualism explores another objection. Rene Descartes claimed that the essence of the self exists within an immaterial soul or thinking substance (Descartes, 1641/1973). If identity is tied to the soul, then transfer via machine is not viable. Teleportation would therefore fail to preserve the self, even if the duplicate possesses the same memories and traits. Dualism underscores the metaphysical suspicion that quintessential parts of an individual’s identity may be lost in the teleportation process.
Conclusion
While animalism, Williams’ view, and dualism highlight points of contention regarding teleportation, their objections depend on prioritising strict identity over survival. Parfit (1984) shows that this emphasis is misplaced, arguing that preserving psychological continuity matters more than being numerically the same individual. Teleportation guarantees the survival of memory, intentions, and character, even if the initial biological organism is destroyed. Thus, although it may undermine strict identity, it preserves what is most significant for rational survival. Consequently, teleportation does not amount to death; it changes our perception of survival.
References
Clairborne, V. (1995). The Cambridge companion to Locke (pp. 56–59). Cambridge University
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Descartes. (1973). Meditations on First Philosophy (E. S. Haldane, Ed.; Vol. 1). Cambridge
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Locke, J. (1975). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (P. H. Nidditch, Ed.; pp. 328–348).
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Olson, E. T. (1995). Human people or human animals? Philosophical Studies, 80(2), 159–181.
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Olson, E. T. (1999). The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology. Oxford University
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Parfit, D. (1971). Personal Identity. The Philosophical Review, 80(1), 3–27.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2184309
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford University Press.
Williams, B. (1970). The Self and the Future. The Philosophical Review, 79(2), 161–180. JSTOR.
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